Fostering in a new age of vicarious liability? by Lindsay, Bobby
 
 
 
 
 
Lindsay, B. (2018) Fostering in a new age of vicarious liability? Edinburgh 
Law Review, 22(2), pp. 294-301.(doi:10.3366/elr.2018.0489) 
 
This is the author’s final accepted version. 
 
There may be differences between this version and the published version. 
You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from 
it. 
 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/162381/  
                    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deposited on: 11 June 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk  
 
Fostering in a New Age of Vicarious Liability?* 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Armes v Nottinghamshire County Council,1 the UK Supreme Court considered the liability 
of a local authority for abuse which had been suffered by the claimant as a child, after being 
placed by the local authority with foster parents. Was the local authority responsible, either 
directly or vicariously, for the abuse perpetrated by the foster parents? The claim based on 
direct liability – alleging a breach of a non-delegable duty to ensure that care was taken of the 
claimant – was dismissed unanimously.2 However, a majority held that the defendant would 
be vicariously liable for the abuse. The decision continues, in an accelerative fashion, the 
trend of extending the personal scope of vicarious liability beyond the paradigmatic 
employer-employee relationship.3  
This note takes stock of this extension and considers its application to the fostering 
regime in Scotland. Fostering is part of the suite of methods which a Scottish local authority 
can employ to arrange for the care of looked-after children. Children in need of care may be 
placed, under local authority’s supervision, with a parent (referred to as “looked after at home 
care”),4 or with a relative or family friend (“kinship care”).5 Where this is not possible, the 
child may be placed into residential care.6 The local authority also may apply for a 
permanence order empowering it to regulate the residence of the child,7 which may or may 
not include authority for the child to be adopted.8 And in some cases, the authority may seek 
to arrange for the child to be adopted, transferring all parental responsibilities and rights to 
the adopters.9 A relative newcomer to this landscape is the “corporate parent”, which are 
institutions (e.g. NHS trusts, Police Scotland, universities) tasked with promoting the 
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1 [2017] UKSC 60; [2017] 3 WLR 1000.  
2 Armes, para [40]-[51] per Lord Reed; para [75], per Lord Hughes. This note will not discuss 
this point. 
3 See Various Claimants v Institute of the Brothers of the Christian Schools [2012] UKSC 56; 
[2013] 2 AC 1 (“Christian Brothers”); Cox v Ministry of Justice [2016] UKSC 10; [2016] AC 
660 (“Cox”). See also Various Claimants v Barclays Bank Plc [2017] EWHC 1929 (QB).   
4 The Looked After Children (Scotland) Regulations 2009, SSI 2009/210, Part IV.   
5 Ibid, Part V.  
6 Children (Scotland) Act 1995, section 26(1)(b); The Residential Establishments – Child 
Care (Scotland) Regulations 1996, SSI 1996/3256.  
7 Adoption and Children etc (Scotland) Act 2007, sections 80-86.  
8 Adoption and Children etc (Scotland) Act 2007, section 80(2)(c) and section 83. 
9 Adoption and Children etc (Scotland) Act 2007, Part 1, especially sections28-34. 
interests of looked-after children and care-experienced young people.10 This note, however, 
focuses primarily on the position of foster carers, as did the decision in Armes.  
 
B. FACTS AND LEGISLATIVE CONTEXT 
The claimant was taken into the care of the defendant in 1985, which placed her with a series 
of foster parents. She suffered physical, emotional, and sexual abuse during two of these 
placements. Years later, she claimed compensation from the defendant local authority on the 
basis of its vicarious liability for the abuse, which had to be determined in accordance with 
the legislative regime in force at the time of the abuse.  
In outline, the defendant selected the foster parents, provided relevant training, 
appointed a social worker to dispense guidance throughout the placement, paid allowances, 
reimbursed expenses, and provided loans of essential equipment. The child was assigned her 
own social worker who visited the family home regularly. The parents also had to present the 
children for medical examination at the order of the defendant, which retained the power to 
consent to the child’s treatment. The defendant’s approval was necessary before the child 
could go on holiday, attend school trips, or sleep over with friends. Ultimately, the defendant 
could remove the child from the foster home if it deemed the placement no longer to be in the 
child’s best interests. 
Against this background, Males J11 and the Court of Appeal12 held that the 
relationship between the foster parents and the local authority was not one which gave rise to 
vicarious liability. This prompted the claimant’s appeal to the UK Supreme Court.  
 
C. VICARIOUS LIABILITY: AN OVERVIEW 
A defendant will be vicariously liable for a tortfeasor’s acts if: 
(1) the relationship between the defendant and the tortfeasor is such as to give rise to 
vicarious liability (a “relationship akin to employment”), and; 
(2) the tortfeasor’s acts or omissions are so closely connected with its relationship with 
the defendant to make it fair, just and reasonable for the defendant to be vicariously 
liable for them. 
Armes considered the first criterion: was the local authority vicariously liable for the tort of a 
foster parent with whom it had placed a child in exercise of its statutory powers? As the 
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situation involved no formalised employment or agency agreement, the question was whether 
or not that relationship could be characterised as one “akin to employment”.  
In Christian Brothers, the Supreme Court identified five features of the 
employee/employer relationship which justified the imposition of vicarious liability:13  
1. The employer usually will be better-resourced to meet any award of compensation 
made to the victim;  
2. The tort will have resulted from activity carried out by the employee on behalf of the 
employer; 
3. The employee’s activity will be part of the employer’s business activities; 
4. The business activity of the employer will have created the risk of the tort which 
befell the victim; 
5. The employer will exercise a degree of control over the employee.  
If the relationship under examination also evidences these factors, then the imposition of 
vicarious liability may be justified. Importantly, “business” is not to be read as solely limiting 
the doctrine’s application to activities of a commercial or profit-making nature.14 So long as 
the tortfeasor does not carry out a “recognisably independent business”, then the defendant 
may be held vicariously liable for torts committed in the course of activities which were 
integral to the defendant’s business.15  
As Lord Hughes recognised in Armes,16 some of these factors are of dubious value as 
touchstones for application in case-by-case assessments of the relevant relationship. Resource 
considerations and the fact that the defendant’s engagement of the tortfeasor has created the 
risk of a tort being committed in the course of the relevant activities simply are general 
justifications for the doctrine of vicarious liability and are of no use in assessing the nature of 
the relevant relationship in individual cases. As Lord Hughes observed,17 the only factors of 
assistance in individual determinations are the degrees of integration and control, on which 
this note will focus. However, even pared down to these two factors, Armes demonstrates 
that, once one strays from the archetypal employee-employer relationship, the assessment of 
the relevant relationship is no easy matter. 
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17 Armes, para [77].  
D. “A RELATIONSHIP AKIN TO EMPLOYMENT”: APPLICATION 
1. Vicarious Liability Established: Lord Reed (Majority) 
Lord Reed identified the relevant “business” activity of the local authority as “the care of 
children who had been committed to their care”.18 A number of factors demonstrated the 
integration of the foster parents with that activity:19 they were recruited and trained by the 
local authority to provide care; they were paid allowances to indemnify any expenses 
incurred in the raising of the child; they were expected to co-operate and frequently liaise 
with social workers regarding the child’s upbringing; and, if deemed to be conducive to the 
child’s development, they were obliged to permit contact with the child’s biological family. 
One could not demarcate between the activity of the local authority, “who were responsible 
for the care of the child and the promotion of her welfare”, and the foster carers whom the 
local authority had selected as the best vessel to provide care that satisfied the child’s welfare 
needs.20  
As for the issue of control, while the foster parents retained discretion as to the day-to-
day running of the family home, with no consistent, “ground-level” oversight or “micro-
management”, there nevertheless was a “significant degree of control over both what the 
foster parents did and how they did it….”21 The local authority initially selected the foster 
parents, monitored the placement for its duration, were to be informed of any serious incident 
befalling the child, were to be permitted to visit the property and see the child at any time, 
had the power to order the medical examination of the child, and ultimately could terminate 
the placement and remove the child where in the best interests of the child. Correspondingly, 
they “exercised powers of approval, inspection, supervision and removal without any parallel 
in ordinary family life.”22  Even this “vestigial” level of control was sufficient to ground a 
finding of vicarious liability.23 
 
2. Vicarious Liability Rejected: Lord Hughes 
For Lord Hughes, the local authority’s “business” did not include the provision of family life. 
Rather, their “business” was to ensure that the children were housed and placed with 
appropriate carers, and to monitor the suitability of that placement for its duration. Once such 
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20 Armes, para [60].  
21 Armes, para [62].  
22 Armes, para [62]. 
23 See Cox, para [21]. 
placement was made, the provision of care, love, and affection was all the “business” of the 
foster parents independently.24 The foster parents, not the local authority, actually raised the 
children as part of their family, and “family life is not consistent with the kind of organisation 
which the enterprise test of vicarious liability contemplates.”25 
This was emphasised by the fact that it was a possibility, and indeed a priority, that 
the child be housed with a “connected carer”. A relative or family friend bringing up a child 
as one of their own could not be said to be “part of the local authority’s ‘enterprise’” and, as 
his Lordship thought it impossible to distinguish the role of such carers from non-connected 
foster parents,26 the continuing relationship between the foster parents and the local authority 
was not one which could attract the application of vicarious liability. Lord Reed sought to 
address this argument by stating that parents who had care of their children would be “raising 
their own child” which was clearly more independent from the local authority’s child care 
services than raising an unrelated child.27 But it is not clear if the same argument holds true 
for other “connected carers”, who are not “raising their own child” but “raising the child as if 
one of their own” which, saving the degree of familiarity and affinity, would be in the same 
fashion as a foster carer would raise the child.  
 
E. APPLICATION IN SCOTLAND? 
1. Background 
Fostering in Scotland is regulated principally by The Looked After Children (Scotland) 
Regulations 2009.28 Foster care is not a homogenous concept, with the varying regimes 
having different degrees of responsibility and integration on the part of the carers.29 Certain 
fostering arrangements may involve a formal employment relationship,30 thereby satisfying 
the first stage of the vicarious liability enquiry with ease. Outside of this situation, the 
                                                     
24 Armes, para [88]. 
25 Armes, para [88]. 
26 Armes, para [87].  
27 Armes, para [71]. 
28 SSI 2009/210: the “2009 Regulations”.  
29 For the pre-Armes English position, see P Morgan, ‘Ripe for Reconsideration: Foster 
Carers, Context, and Vicarious Liability’, (2012) 20(2) Torts Law Journal 110. 
30 See for example Johnstone v Glasgow City Council, Cases 41039722016 & 4103973 2016 
PH, Employment Tribunal, Glasgow, 1 August 2017.  
imposition of vicarious liability for delicts committed by foster parents31 in Scots law will 
depend on a close examination on the prevailing legislation.32  
Scottish local authorities have a duty to accommodate children in need of care,33 and may 
discharge this duty by placement with any “suitable” person.34 This regime maintains a 
distinction between parental carers (those providing care “at home” for children who are the 
subject of a Compulsory Supervision Order made by a Children’s Hearing Panel)35, “kinship 
carers”, and “foster carers”. Before placing the child with a foster carer, the possibility of 
placement with the first two classes of carers must be considered.36 A snapshot analysis of 
the potential application of vicarious liability to these categories, which proceeds on the 
assumption that Armes applies in Scotland,37 now follows.  
 
2. Parental and Kinship Carers 
The obligations placed on parental carers are not extensive: they need not be approved prior 
to the placement and have only the obligation to notify serious occurrences befalling the 
child.38 They also are subject to a less frequent review period than the other classes of carer: 
(once a year, as opposed to every six months),39 apparently cannot claim for a specific care-
triggered allowance,40 and are exempt from the local authority’s duty to ensure regular 
visitation by a social worker.41 Therefore, it seems likely that, following the comments of 
Lord Reed,42 a court would conclude that a parental carer would not be sufficiently integrated 
                                                     
31 There also is a growing incidence of registered fostering carer agencies. Such agencies 
independently assess potential carers, provide in-house training and support networks, and 
pay carers a fee in addition to allowances. This demonstrates a substantial degree of 
independence from the supervisory local authorities, and therefore, applying the Christian 
Brothers criteria, these agencies may be vicariously liable for delicts committed by carers 
operating under their aegis.  
32 For a detailed treatment of children in care, see K Norrie, The Law of Parent and Child in 
Scotland, 3rd edn (SULI, 2013), especially ch 15.   
33 Children (Scotland) Act 1995, section 25. 
34 Ibid, section 26(1)(a)(iii). 
35 See Children’s Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011, section 83. 
36 2009 Regulations, regulation 27(2)(e).  
37 Armes was applied by Sheriff Reid in Grubb v Shannon [2018] SC GLA 13 to find the operator of a 
beauty salon vicariously liable for the negligence of a beauty therapist using the salon’s branding and 
premises. 
38 2009 Regulations, regulations 8 and 9.  
39 2009 Regulations, regulation 44, cf regulation 45.   
40 2009 Regulations, regulation 33, provides only for foster and kinship care allowances.  
41 2009 Regulations, regulation 46(1).  
42 Armes, para [71]. 
within the local authority’s care-provision business for vicarious liability to arise. Kinship 
carers essentially have the same obligations as a foster carer (as detailed below) but are 
appointed and approved on an ad-hoc basis43 and are not subject to ongoing review as to their 
personal suitability for care, which may distinguish them from the position of foster carers.  
 
3. Foster Carers 
Local authorities must establish a fostering panel44 which determines the suitability of 
prospective foster carers and the appropriate placements for individual carers.45 Once the 
carer is approved,46 they must enter into a foster carer agreement with the local authority.47 
This must detail general matters (for example, the training, review, complaint-handing and 
placement procedures), financial entitlements,48 and the carer’s obligations (e.g. notification 
of incidents and changes in circumstances, confidentiality, not to administer corporal 
punishment).49 Importantly, carers are to care for placed children as if they were part of their 
family, with “regard to the local authority’s immediate and longer-term arrangements for the 
child.”50 These arrangements will be assessed as soon as the child enters the care system51 
and be detailed in the “child’s plan”.52  
In addition to this general agreement, individual agreements must be entered into 
before each and every placement.53 This must detail, among other matters, the child’s plan, 
the objectives which the local authority aims for the placement to achieve, the financial 
support which the local authority is to provide, the arrangements for local authority 
visitations, contact with relatives, and the circumstances in which approval must be sought 
before the child resides outside the foster home or is taken care of by another person.54 The 
foster carer’s general suitability to serve as a care provider is kept under frequent review.55 
                                                     
43 2009 Regulations, regulation 10.  
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45 2009 Regulations, regulation 20. 
46 2009 Regulations, regulation 21.  
47 2009 Regulations, regulation 24. 
48 2009 Regulations, regulation 33.  
49 2009 Regulations, Schedule 6.  
50 2009 Regulations, Schedule 6, para 6(c). 
51 2009 Regulations, regulation 4.  
52 2009 Regulations, regulation 5, and Schedule 2, Part II.  
53 2009 Regulations, regulation 27(2)(g). 
54 2009 Regulations, Schedule 4.  
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Furthermore, each individual placement is reviewed specifically,56 with regular visits to be 
made by social workers.57 If the local authority concludes that the placement is no longer in 
the best interests of the child, it should terminate the placement forthwith.58  
It is submitted that the level of integration and control present in these arrangements 
goes beyond that detailed in Armes. The “child’s plan” identifies the needs of the child and is 
formulated by the local authority in consultation with an array of parties, and the foster carer 
is tasked with caring for the child in accordance with the plan. In that sense, the foster carer is 
“integrated” within the individual care regime provided for the child by the local authority, 
and the carer’s success in meeting those needs is kept under sustained review.59 The existence 
of specific agreements detailing a particular carer’s responsibilities, and another agreement 
detailing their responsibilities in the context of a specific placement, is indicative of a 
reasonably high level of control on the part of the local authority, and strengthens the analogy 
with employment. The fostering panels also must review the approval of foster carers, 
independently from their duty to review individual placements, which suggests that the carers 
are not independent care-providers for individual placements, but an integrated part of the 
local authority’s care-provision service, as the review must occur regardless of whether or not 
any children presently are placed with the carer.  
 
F. CONCLUSION 
Armes is a significant decision. It entails that acts of abuse in ordinary domestic or social 
environments may, depending on the degree of integration of the perpetrator into its 
“business”, render a defendant vicariously liable. While one cannot doubt that the result is a 
“fair, just, and reasonable” one, the analysis seems to be complicated by reliance on the full 
suite of the Christian Brothers factors. Nevertheless, using Armes’s touchstones of 
integration and control, this note suggests that the imposition of vicarious liability in Scotland 
is a likely consequence of the local authority’s decision to place a child with a foster carer, 
but may not follow if the placement is with a kinship or parental carer.    
Bobby Lindsay  
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